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David Reid* and Aboriginal Rights and the Atlantic
Stephanie Hickman** Canada Petroleum Industry
The authors explore the recent developments in Aboriginal law and their
implications for the petroleum industry in Atlantic Canada. To set the stage,
they provide a brief historical overview of Aboriginal settlement and land-use in
the region, followed by a brief review of the petroleum industry's development
in Atlantic Canada. After examining the state of the jurisprudence relating to
Aboriginal rights generally, the authors turn to the current state of aboriginal rights,
rights claims, and consultation obligations in the Atlantic Canadian context. The
impact of the current state of the law on the petroleum industry is then analyzed
and future trends outlined.
Les auteurs examinent les d6veloppements r6cents en droit des Autochtones et
leurs cons6quences pour I'industrie p6trolire au Canada atlantique. Pour situer le
lecteur ils font d'abord un survol historique de 1'6tablissement des Autochtones et
de leur utilisation des terres dans la r6gion, suivi d'un apergu du d6veloppement
de I'industrie p~troliere au Canada atlantique. Aprus avoir analys6 I'6tat de la
jurisprudence traitant des droits des Autochtones en g6n6ral, les auteurs se
penchent sur 1'6tat actuel des droits des Autochtones, de revendications de
droits et des obligations de consultation dans le contexte du Canada atlantique.
L'impact de l'6tat actuel du droit sur Iindustrie p6troli6re est ensuite analyse et les
tendances futures sont decrites.
* Partner at Cox and Palmer, Halifax, Nova Scotia office.
** Partner at Cox and Palmer, St. John's, Newfoundland office.
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Introduction
This paper explores recent developments in Aboriginal law and their
implications for the petroleum industry in Atlantic Canada. To set the
stage, a brief historical overview of Aboriginal settlement and land use in
Atlantic Canada is provided. The paper then generally describes Aboriginal
jurisprudence in Canada before moving to an examination of the current
state of Aboriginal and treaty rights in Atlantic Canada A brief summary
of the status of Aboriginal and treaty right negotiations in each of the four
Atlantic Provinces is then provided. The paper concludes with an analysis
of how the current state of Aboriginal law in Atlantic Canada may impact
on development of the petroleum industry in this region.
I. Historical overview ofAboriginal settlement and land use
1' Maritime Provinces
There are two primary Aboriginal groups in the Maritime Provinces: the
Mi'kmaq and the Maliseet. The Mi'kmaq traditionally occupied parts of
northern and eastern New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward
Island. The Maliseet traditionally resided along the Saint John River in
western New Brunswick.
Estimates from the early seventeenth century suggest the Mi'kmaq
population to have been in the range of 3,500, while the Maliseet population
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numbered about 1,000.1 By this time, however both groups had likely
suffered considerable decline in numbers due to epidemic diseases that
arrived with the Europeans. Depending on the season, the Mi'kmaq
resided either on the coast or in the interior. During the fall and winter
months, activities centred around the hunting of seal, moose, beaver, otter,
bear and caribou. In the spring and summer, life focused on coastal areas,
with fishing being the primary activity.
In the seventeenth century, the Mi'kmaq and Maliseet became loyal
allies of the French and partners in the fur trade.2 By the 1713 Treaty of
Utrecht, French possessions in Atlantic Canada were reduced to Prince
Edward Island (Isle St. Jean) and Cape Breton Island (Isle Royale). During
the period following the Treaty of Utrecht, the French constructed Fortress
Louisburg on Cape Breton Island, while their Aboriginal allies continued
raids and attacks on English ships and settlements. The British responded
to the First Nafion attacks by establishing a bounty on Mi'kmaq scalps.3
Hostilities continued until shortly after the fall of Louisburg in 1758, at
which time the Mi'kmaq were forced to make peace with the English.4
In Nova Scotia (as of 2001) there are currently thirteen Mi'kmaq
First Nation communities, with a combined population of approximately
12,000 people.5 There are thirty-eight reserves in Nova Scotia. In New
Brunswick, there is a combined Maliseet and Mi'kmaq population of
approximately 11,000 people, 7,400 of which reside on reserve. 6 There
are nine Mi'kmaq and six Maliseet First Nation communities in New
Brunswick. 7 There are two Mi'kmaq First Nation communities on Prince
Edward Island.8 The population is estimated to be approximately 1,000
people, about half of whom live on the four reserves on the Island.9
2. Newfoundland and Labrador
At the time of first contact with Europeans, the Beothuk inhabited
Newfoundland and Labrador. Estimates of their population vary from
approximately 500 at the time of John Cabot's first visit in 1497 to 50,000.10
1. Alan D. McMillan, Native Peoples and Cultures of Canada (Vancouver: Douglas and MacIntyre,
1988) at 44.
2. Ibid. at 50.
3. Ibid. at 51.
4. Ibid.
5. Thomas Isaac, Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in the Maritimes (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing,
2001) at 34.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid. at 33.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. McMillan, supra note I at 42.
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However, the Beothuk population dramatically plummeted after contact
with the Europeans, and the death of the British captive, Shanawdithit, in
1829 is generally held to mark the date of the Beothuk extinction." The
causes of the severe population declines were primarily related to disease
introduced by the Europeans and hostile encounters with the newcomers
and with Mi'kmaq from Nova Scotia, who began to arrive in the province
shortly after the arrival of the Europeans. 2 The Mi'kmaq do not appear
to have begun settlement in Newfoundland until after the arrival of the
Europeans. 3 Following the extinction of the Beothuk nation, the.Mi'kmaq
remained as the only native inhabitants of the island of Newfoundland.
Today, in Newfoundland and Labrador, there is one Mi'kmaq
First Nation: Miawpukek (Conne River) Band, located in southern
Newfoundland. The population of this community is slightly over 2,500.14
Additionally, there are 1,235 Innu in Quebec and Labrador and 2,634 Inuit
living primarily in the northern reaches of Labrador."
II. The nature ofAboriginal rights in Atlantic Canada
1. National Overview
The legal foundation of Aboriginal rights in Atlantic Canada is largely
the same as the rest of the country and, as such, this section will provide
a brief overview of that foundation prior to exploring some of the unique
features of Aboriginal rights in Atlantic Canada.
Aboriginal title and Aboriginal rights are not synonymous. The
Supreme Court of Canada in R v. Adams stated that Aboriginal title is
"simply one manifestation of a broader based conception of aboriginal
rights."' 6 In other words, Aboriginal rights, as recognized and affirmed by
s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982,17 are many and varied. Aboriginal
title, in contrast, is a particular type of Aboriginal right, "distinct from other
aboriginal rights because it arises where the connection for a group with a
piece of land 'was of central significance to their distinctive culture. '"8
I. Ibid. at44.
12. Ibid. at43.
13. Newfoundland (Minister of Government Services & Lands) v. Drew, 2006 NLCA 53, (2006), 260
Nfld. & P.E.I.R.I at para. 41 [Drew (C.A.)].
14. Canada, "Aboriginal Peoples in the Atlantic Region," online: Department of Indian And Northern
Affairs <http://www.aine-inac.gc.ca/at/mp/pg3 Ie.html>.
15. Canada, "Miawpukek Band," online: Department of Indian And Northern Affairs <www.ainc-
inac.gc.ca/at/abor e.html>.
16. R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101 at para. 25 [Adams].
17. Constitution Act, s. 35, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K), 1982, c. 11 [Constitution
Act, 1982].
18. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 at para. 137 [Delgamuukw], quoting
from Adams, supra note 16 at para. 26.
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The Supreme Court of Canada has developed different' criteria
for the establishment of an Aboriginal title claim from those of an
Aboriginal rights claim, which is different again from a treaty right (all
of which will be discussed below). Regardless of the particular species
of Aboriginal right, the Supreme Court has made clear in the decision of
Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 19 that the Crown
has an obligation to consult with Aboriginal peoples when it has real or
constructive knowledge of an Aboriginal right that may be adversely
affected by a government decision.2" As it is often government action in
the form of issuing permits and licences for industrial purposes that invoke
the consultation obligation, industry generally, and the energy industry in
particular, has a direct interest in understanding the nature of Aboriginal
rights.
Although Aboriginal and treaty rights are constitutionally recognized
by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,2' much of the practical
substance of Aboriginal and treaty rights has been left to the courts to
determine. As a result of the evolution of jurisprudence since 1982,
Canadian courts have established various legal thresholds that must be
met to substantiate Aboriginal and treaty rights claims. For the purposes
of this paper, Aboriginal rights will be divided into three species of rights:
non-title rights, title rights, and treaty rights.
The general analytical framework for determining non-title Aboriginal
rights can be discerned from the decisions of the courts. The following is
a skeletal outline of the steps and considerations involved.
In its 1996 ruling in R. v. Van derPeet,22 the Supreme Court of Canada
held that "in order to be an aboriginal right an activity must be an element
of a practice, custom or tradition integral to the distinctive culture of the
aboriginal group claiming the right. ' 23  The Court set out ten guiding
principles for judicial analysis of Aboriginal rights claims:
0 Courts must take into account the perspective of Aboriginal
peoples themselves;
2a
19. Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511
[Haida].
20. Ibid. at para. 35.
21. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 17 [Charier]. S. 25 of the Charter specifically
limits application of the Charter so as to prohibit its application in a manner that would infringe upon
Aboriginal rights in Canada.
22. R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 [Van derPeet].
23. Ibid. at para. 46.
24. Ibid. at para. 49.
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* Courts must identify precisely the nature of the claim being made
in determining whether an Aboriginal claimant has demonstrated
the existence of an Aboriginal right;25
* In order to be integral, a practice, custom or tradition must be of
central significance to the Aboriginal society in question;
26
* The practices, customs and traditions which constitute Aboriginal
rights are those which have continuity with the practices, customs
and traditions that existed prior to contact;27
* Courts must approach the rules of evidence in light of the evidentiary
difficulties inherent in adjudicating Aboriginal claims; 28
* Claims to Aboriginal rights must be adjudicated on a specific,
rather than a general basis; 29
* For a practice, custom or tradition to constitute an Aboriginal right
it must be of independent significance to the Aboriginal culture in
which it exists;30
* The integral to a distinctive culture test requires that a practice,
custom or tradition be distinctive; it does not require that that
practice, custom or tradition be distinct;3 '
* The influence of European culture will only be relevant to the
inquiry if it is demonstrated that the practice, custom or tradition
is only integral because of that influence;32 and
* Courts must take into account both the relationship of Aboriginal
peoples to the land and the distinctive societies and cultures of
Aboriginal peoples.33
If an Aboriginal group establishes an Aboriginal right, using the Van der
Peet factors as a guide, it must then demonstrate that the actions of the
Crown amount to aprimafacie infringement upon this right. This is done
by demonstrating, inter alia, that the action of the Crown constitutes
an unreasonable interference with an Aboriginal right, imposes undue
hardship or denies the rights holders their preferred method of exercising
their right.34
25. Ibid. at para. 51.
26. Ibid. at para. 55.
27. Ibid. at para. 60.
28. Ibid. at para. 68.
29. Ibid. at para. 69.
30. Ibid. at para. 70.
31. Ibid. at para. 71.
32. Ibid. at para. 73.
33. Ibid. at para. 74.
34. R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 at para. 70 [Sparrow]. See also R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2
S.C.R. 723 at paras. 40-43 [Gladstone].
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Once a right and aprimafacie infringement of the right is established,
the Crown must discharge the burden of either:
* proving that the right was extinguished by an act of the Crown
showing a clear intent to extinguish the Aboriginal right;35 or
* justifying the infringement by demonstrating an appropriate
objective while upholding the honour of the Crown "in keeping
with the unique contemporary relationship, grounded in history and
policy, between the Crown and Canada's aboriginal peoples. '36
If the Crown cannot meet its burden, then the Aboriginal right takes
precedence over the offending government action.
The 1997 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Delgamuukw
v. British Columbia37 remains the foundational decision on Aboriginal
title in Canada. In that action, the hereditary chiefs of the Gitksan and
Wet'suwet'en First Nations claimed 58,000 square kilometers of north-
western British Columbia. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court,
the nature of the First Nations' claim had evolved from one of ownership
to one of Aboriginal title.
In order to address the claim of Aboriginal title, the analytical
framework set out in Van der Peet3 needed to be modified. Although there
is substantial over-lap between the prerequisites for establishing Aboriginal
rights and Aboriginal title, Lamer C.J.C. noted two primary distinctions:
First, under the test for aboriginal title, the requirement that the land
be integral to the distinctive culture of the claimants is subsumed by
the requirement of occupancy, and second, whereas the time for the
identification of aboriginal rights is the time of first contact, the time
for the identification of aboriginal title is the time at which the Crown
asserted sovereignty over the land.39
Chief Justice Lamer then went on to set out the test to be met to prove
Aboriginal title:
In order to make out a claim for aboriginal title, the aboriginal group
asserting title must satisfy the following criteria: (i) the land must have
been occupied prior to sovereignty, (ii) if present occupation is relied
on as proof of occupation pre-sovereignty, there must be a continuity
35. Ibid. (Gladstone), at paras. 31, 34, and 72, where Lamer C.J.C. noted that appropriate objectives
are "the recognition of prior occupation ofNorth America byAboriginal peoples or... the reconciliation
of Aboriginal prior occupation with the assertion of the sovereignty of the Crown." See also R. v.
Sappier, 2006 SCC 54, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 686 at paras. 56-60 [Sappier].
36. Sparrow, supra note 34 at para. 64.
37. Supra note 18.
38. Van der Peet, supra note 22.
39. Delgamuukw, supra note 18 at para. 142.
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between present and pre-sovereignty occupation, and (iii) at sovereignty,
that occupation must have been exclusive.4"
Assuming, for the moment, that an Aboriginal group meets the foregoing
test, there is still the question of the nature of the title that the group has,
prima facie, to establish. The answer is that Aboriginal title entitles the
Aboriginal community to the "exclusive use and occupation of the land"
in all ways that are not "irreconcilable with the nature of the group's
attachment to that land."'" This, of course, begs the question of the nature
of an Aboriginal group's attachment to the land. The "irreconcilable use"
limitation requires a re-examination of the evidentiary foundation which
substantiated the Aboriginal title claim and, in particular, a re-examination
of the nature of the Aboriginal group's occupation of the land.
At paragraph 128 of Delgamuukw, Lamer C.J.C. makes the analytical
observation that links the test to the inherent limitations of Aboriginal
title:
one of the critical elements in the determination of whether a particular
aboriginal group has aboriginal title to certain lands is the matter of the
occupancy of those lands. Occupancy is determined by reference to the
activities that have taken place on the land and the uses to which the land
has been put by the particular group. If lands are so occupied, there will
exist a special bond between the group and the land in question such that
the land will be part of the definition of the group's distinctive culture.
Because of the "special bond" and its creation through particular types
of activities, it would be inconsistent to create a form of title that permits
the destruction of the foundations upon which it is built. Lamer, C.J.C.
provides the examples of strip mining a hunting ground and turning land
of ceremonial or cultural significance into a parking lot42 as activities that
would be inconsistent with Aboriginal title.
It is also the special bond between Aboriginal groups and the lands
they hold pursuant to Aboriginal title that leads to the general prohibition
on alienating such lands, except to the Crown. These lands "are more than
just a fungible commodity. '43 The land has an important non-economic
value that is unique to the relationship between the Aboriginal group and
the land for which it- holds Aboriginal title.
Notwithstanding the special bond between an Aboriginal group and
specific lands, groups holding Aboriginal title may always surrender their
40. Ibid. atpara. 143.
41. Ibid. atpara..117.
42. Ibid. atpara. 128.
43. Ibid. atpara. 129.
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title to the Crown." Such surrender would be in effect a renouncement of the
special bond to the land and could be used by Aboriginal groups to enable
them, or others, to use the land in ways that would be irreconcilable with
Aboriginal title. As an example, it may be possible for an Aboriginal group
to partake in an industrial activity that would otherwise be prohibited. The
group could surrender its Aboriginal title over a portion of its Aboriginal
title lands to the Crown in exchange for valuable consideration, which
may include fee simple title to the land. This land would then be owned
by the group as a fully transferable economic asset, capable of any sort
of development that could have been permitted but for the existence of
Aboriginal title. Such a surrender of Aboriginal title, however, would not
and should not be taken lightly by an Aboriginal group, as a surrender
ends the legal significance of the group's cultural and historical ties to the
land. -
In addition to the Aboriginal group's ability to enable the pursuit
of activities that are inconsistent with Aboriginal title, the Crown may
infringe Aboriginal title, as it may infringe other Aboriginal rights, where
it can demonstrate appropriate justification. This justification is measured
against a two part test:
1. The infringement of the Aboriginal right must be in furtherance of a
legislative objective that is compelling and substantial; 4 and
2. The infringement must be consistent with the special fiduciary
relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples. 4
The all-encompassing nature of Aboriginal title means that an
infringement is more likely to occur in the context of Aboriginal title than
in the context of Aboriginal rights. Any interference with the Aboriginal
group's use and enjoyment of the land could form the basis of an
infringement, as the right to exclusive use and occupation of lands is much
broader than a specific Aboriginal right to fish, harvest logs or hunt.
The Supreme Court of Canada decision in R v. Badger47 noted that
treaty rights are different from other forms of Aboriginal rights. Treaty
rights are contained in official agreements between the Crown and native
peoples and are enforceable obligations based on the mutual consent of
44. Ibid. atpara. 131.
45. Ibid. at para. 161.
46. Ibid. at para. 162. For a further review and application of the principles outlined in Haida, supra
note 19, see Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), 2004
SCC 74, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 550 [Taku River].
47. R. v. Badger, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771 [Badger].
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the parties . 48 However, both Aboriginal and treaty rights are unique, or sui
generis, and in both the honour of the Crown is engaged.49
The Court in Badger also described the foundational principles of
treaty interpretation in the Aboriginal context:
* A treaty represents an exchange of solemn promises between the
Crown and the applicable First Nation;
" The honour of the Crown is always at stake when dealing with
Aboriginal people and, as a result, treaty and statutory interpretation
must be approached in a manner which maintains the integrity of
the Crown;
* Any ambiguities or doubtful expressions in the wording of a treaty
or document must be resolved in favour of the First Nation and
any limitations which restrict the rights of the First Nation under
the treaty must be narrowly construed;
* The onus of proving that a treaty or Aboriginal right has been
extinguished lies upon the Crown; and
* There must be a strict proof of the fact of extinguishment and
evidence of a clear and plain intention on the part of the government
to extinguish treaty rights.50
Chief Justice McLachlin in R. v. Marshall51 (dissenting in result, but not
in respect of the applicable principles) summarized the principles of treaty
interpretation as follows:
" Aboriginal treaties constitute unique types of agreements and
attract special principles of interpretation;
* Treaties should be liberally construed and ambiguities and doubtful
expressions should be resolved in faVour of the Aboriginal
signatories;
* The goal of treaty interpretation is to choose from among the
various possible interpretations of common intention the one
which best reconciles the interest of both parties at the time the
treaty was signed;
* In searching for the common intention of the parties, the integrity
and honour of the Crown is presumed;
* In determining the signatories' respective understanding and
intentions, the court must be sensitive to the unique cultural and
linguistic differences between the parties;
48. Ibid. at para 76.
49. Ibid. at para. 78.
50. Ibid. at para. 41.
51. R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 [Marshall l].
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* The words of the treaty must be given the sense which they would
naturally have held for the parties at the time;
* Technical or contractual interpretation of treaty wording should be
avoided;
•* While construing the language generously, courts cannot alter the
terms of the treaty by exceeding what is possible or realistic from
the language; and
* Treaty rights of Aboriginal peoples must not be interpreted in a
static or rigid way; they are not frozen at the date of signature and
the interpreting court must update treaty rights to provide for their
modem exercise. 2
Further clarification of the rules of treaty interpretation can be found in
Binnie J.'s reasons in Marshall I, inwhich he indicates that "'generous'
rules of interpretation should not be confused with a vague sense of after-
the-fact largesse. ''53
When the Supreme Court released its decision in Haida4 in November
2004, it further developed the concept of Crown consultation discussed in
Delgamuukw, in which Lamer C.J.C. had affirmed that there "is always a
duty to consult"" if there is a potential infringement. Chief Justice Lamer
set out a spectrum of consultation that varies depending on the potential
infringement:
The nature and scope of the duty of consultation will vary with the
circumstances. In occasional cases, when the breach is less serious or
relatively minor, it will be no more than a duty to discuss important
decisions that will be taken with respect to lands held pursuant to
aboriginal title. Of course, even in these rare cases when the minimum
acceptable standard is consultation, this consultation must be in good
faith, and with the intention of substantially addressing the concerns of
the aboriginal peoples whose lands are at issue. In most cases, it will
be significantly deeper than mere consultation. Some cases may even
require the full consent of an aboriginal nation, particularly when
provinces enact hunting and fishing regulations in relation to aboriginal
lands.56
In Haida, McLachlin C.J.C. confirmed that the former Chief Justice's
observations in Delgamuukw "apply as much to unresolved claims as to
52. Ibid at para. 78.
53. Ibid. at para. 14.
54. Haida, supra note 19.
55. Delgamuukw, supra note 18 at para. 168.
56. Ibid. at para. 168.
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intrusions on settled claims."" The duty to consult is rooted in the Crown's
legal obligation to uphold the "honour of the Crown" in all dealings with
Aboriginal peoples." The underlying logic of requiring consultation even
before a claim is fully established was concisely stated by the Court:
To unilaterally exploit a claimed resource during the process of proving
and resolving the Aboriginal claim to that resource; may be to deprive
the Aboriginal claimants of some or all of the benefit of the resource.
That is not honourable.59
The risk of depreciation of the value of a potential Aboriginal right before
it is fully established necessitates that the duty to consult "arises when the
Crown has knowledge, real or constructive, of the potential existence of
the Aboriginal right or title and contemplates conduct that might adversely
affect it."
'60
In Haida, the Supreme Court made clear that consultation was not an
end in itself. Consultation is by its nature an exchange of information and
the content of such information can give rise to further duties: in particular,
the duty to accommodate. Where the exchange of information reveals a
strong primafacie case for an Aboriginal right "and the consequences of
the government's proposed decision may adversely affect it in a significant
way, addressing the Aboriginal concerns may require taking steps to avoid
irreparable harm or to minimize the effects of infringement, pending final
resolution of the underlying claim." 6 1
The process of consultation and accommodation is one of compromise.
It does not provide Aboriginal groups with a veto over activities pending
final settlement of Aboriginal claims.62 Further, the potential requirement
of consent established in Delgamuukw was not extended to Aboriginal
rights claims.63 In addition, the Supreme Court made it clear that legal
responsibility for the duty to consult rests solely with the Crown, although
it does have the flexibility to "delegate procedural aspects of consultation
to industry" as is often done in the environmental assessment process. 64
The fact that direct legal responsibility for consultation rests with the
Crown, however, does not immunize third parties from the consequences
of a breach of the Crown's obligation. Permits, licences and approvals
57. Haida, supra note 19 at para. 24.
58. Ibid. atpara. 16.
59. Ibid. at para. 27.
60. Ibid. at para. 35.
61. Ibid. at para. 47.
62. Ibid. at para. 48.
63. Ibid. at para. 48.
64. Ibid. at para. 53.
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granted by the Crown remain subject to challenge. As such, the third party
beneficiaries of such licences continue to have a direct interest in ensuring
that the Crown meets its duty to Aboriginal peoples.
In Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project
Assessment Director),65 McLachlin C.J.C. considered the Crown's duty
to consult with and accommodate Aboriginal peoples when making
decisions that may adversely affect as yet unproven rights and title claims.
The Aboriginal Band participated in an environmental assessment process
lasting three years which ultimately found the band disappointed in the
result of a decision of Redfern Resources and the province to reopen an
old mine. Chief Justice McLachlin found that the process of consultation
undertaken by the province met the requirements of the duty to consult
and accommodate:
Where consultation is meaningful, there is no ultimate duty to reach
agreement. Rather, accommodation requires that Aboriginal concems be
balanced reasonably with the potential impact of the particular decision
on those concerns and with competing societal concerns. Compromise is
inherent to the reconciliation process.66
Discharging the duty to consult and accommodate does not require a duty
to reach agreement, but it does require a participation element that is
"meaningful" to the Aboriginal band. The duty is not dependent necessarily
on where the Aboriginal band or community is situated, merely that an
Aboriginal claim exists or potentially exists.
The duty to consult may also extend to private lands. In Badger,67 the
Supreme Court noted that treaty rights may be exercised on private land
where the exercise of the treaty right is not incompatible with the existing
visible land-use.68 Arguably, therefore, a government decision authorizing
an incompatible use would infringe an Aboriginal right and invoke the
duty of consultation.
In 2005, the British Columbia Supreme Court in Hupacasath First
Nation v. British Columbia69 heard a petition for judicial review of the
decisions of the Minister of Forests to remove certain privately owned
land from a tree farm licence and to make a new annual allowable cut for
that licence. 70 The lands in question were part of the geographical territory
65. Supra note 46.
66. Ibid. at para. 2.
67. Badger, supra note 47.
68. Ibid. at paras. 51, 65-66.
69. Hupacasath First Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2005 BCSC 1712, [2006] 51
B.C.L.R. (4-) 133 [Hupacasath].
70. Ibid. at para. 4.
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over which the Hupacasath First Nation had Aboriginal rights claims. In
its analysis, the Court held that fee simple title to land is not fundamentally
inconsistent with Aboriginal rights:
I conclude that the principles articulated in Haida Nation and Taku River
can apply outside the context of Crown land. The Crown's honour does
not exist only when the Crown is a land-owner. The Crown's honour
can be implicated in this kind of decision-making affecting private land.
Here, the Crown's decision to permit removal of the lands from TFL 44
is one that could give rise to a duty to consult and accommodate.
7
'
In Paul First Nation v. Parkland (County),72 the Alberta Court of Appeal
considered Hupacasath and attempted to limit the effect of the British
Columbia Supreme Court's decision on the basis of its specific factual
context. The. Paul First Nation challenged the decision of the Subdivision
and Development Appeal Board of Parkland County to grant a permit for
the development of a gravel pit. It argued that the development would
hinder its members' ability to travel on pilgrimage to Lac St. Anne and
also their ability to access adjacent lands for hunting and herb gathering. 73
Thus, its Aboriginal rights would potentially be infringed and consultation
was required. This argument was summarily rejected by the Alberta Court
of Appeal, which held that any duty to consult with respect to private lands
arising out of Hupacasath
must be restricted to the facts of that case as it involved an operative
transfer of the lands into a publicly funded government program followed
by an attempt to transfer the lands out of that program. The extensive
involvement of the government was the primary factor that precipitated
the duty to consult in that instance. Here, there is no allegation that
government is involved in the proposed Burnco development. Therefore,
the duty to consult does not arise.74
Unfortunately, it appears that the Alberta Court of Appeal missed the
underlying logic in Hupacasath and, to a lesser extent, Badger It is not
the "extensive involvement" of the Crown that gives rise to the duty to
consult, but the potential impact of the Crown's decision on Aboriginal
rights that invokes the duty to consult.
71. Ibid. atpara. 199.
'72. Paul First Nation v. Parkland (County), 2006 ABCA 128, (2006), 384 A.R. 366 [Paul].
73. Ibid. at para. 9.
74. Ibid. atpara. 14.
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In the Newfoundland Supreme Court (Trial Division) decision in
Newfoundland (Minister of Government Services & Lands) v. Drew,75
Barry J. observed, in obiter, that certain instruments of title, issued by
the Government of Newfoundland prior to Confederation, appeared to
extinguish Aboriginal rights:
Thus, in the case of the Abitibi Freehold Lands, the grant of all the
Crown's "estate, right, title interest, trust etc." in lands together with "the
woods, ways, water-courses, mines, ores and minerals of every kind";
in the case of the Abitibi Charter Lands, the reviewable 99 year lease
confu-rming and guaranteeing "title" and conferring "by way of grant,
sale or devise, and not of exception, all timber and trees being on the said
lands, and also all mines and minerals therein and thereunder"; and in the
Abitibi Timber Leases, granted subject to the Crown lands legislation
in force from time to time, vesting in the licence "the right to take and
keep exclusive possession of the land", vesting "all right of property
whatsoever in all trees and timber" and authorizing prosecution of "all
trespassers", with reservation to the Crown of the right to grant cut-over
land for agriculture or mining and to use timber for public works and
reservation to the public of the right to cut timber for the fisheries, for
fencing and for firewood and like purposes; would appear by necessary
implication to preclude the exercise of Aboriginal rights over the Abitibi
lands.76
In contrast, an instrument of title from the Government, which by statute
was subject to the right of the public to hunt and fish over the lands, left
open the question of Aboriginal rights:
In the case of Comer Brook Pulp and Paper, the situation is not as clear,
because of the conditions in sections 9 and 10 of the 1923 amendment to
the 1915 statutory agreement which preserved for the public the right to
"fish, shoot, hunt and trap over the lands and timber areas". The question
arises whether a possible interpretation of this is that aboriginal rights
to fish, shoot, hunt and trap (and the incidental right to have shelter for
exercise of these rights) is preserved as part of the public right, a question
I need not now answer.77
On appeal, these findings of Barry J. were noted, but not directly addressed.
The unsettled nature of the relationship between Aboriginal rights and the
rights of private land owners, will require further judicial guidance.
75. Newfoundland (Minister of Government Services & Lands) v. Drew, 2003 NLSCTD 105, (2003),
228 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 1 [Drew (Trial)].
76. Ibid. at para. 1155. On appeal this observation was not contested by any party and, although
noted by the Court of Appeal, was not disputed. The Abitibi did not participate in the appeal.
77. Ibid. atpara. 1156.
398 The Dalhousie Law Journal
2. Atlantic Canada
The national jurisprudence on Aboriginal rights is undoubtedly of great
significance to establishing and defining Aboriginal rights in Atlantic
Canada. However, the general national analytical framework is one that
is, of necessity, refined to adapt to the factual circumstances of different
parts of the country. Because of the many centuries of interaction
between Aboriginals and non-Aboriginals in Atlantic Canada, historical
complexities are multiplied. The interactions between the French and the
British colonial powers and the Aboriginal inhabitants of Atlantic Canada
provide much of the context, both legal and historical, for present day
determinations of Aboriginal rights. In addition, Canada's own history as
a confederated country, and particularly the inclusion of Newfoundland in
1949, adds another complexity.
In the period between the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) and the Treaty
of Paris (1763), the British signed several peace and friendship treaties
with the Mi'kmaq and the Maliseet. Most of the treaties contained the
following common elements:
" A recognition of the British Crown's jurisdiction and dominion
over the territory covered;
* An agreement that conflicts between Indians and British settlers
would be settled according to British law;
* An understanding that the Indians would not molest British
settlers; and
* An understanding that the British would not interfere with the
Indians' hunting, fishing, planting and fowling activities.78
The treaties signed in the Maritimes are unique in that there is no cessation
or release by the First Nations of any rights.7 9 The majority of treaties in
other parts of Canada involve Aboriginal people ceding, releasing and
surrendering their rights to land and their traditional activities in return
for specific rights. However, in the Maritimes, the potential exists for
Aboriginal rights to co-exist with treaty rights.
a. Newfoundland and Labrador
The decisions of the Supreme Court (Trial Division) and the Court of
Appeal in Newfoundland (Minister of Government Services & Lands) v.
Drew80 provide an informative case study of the interplay between Atlantic
Canada's unique historical circumstances and legal analysis. Litigation
was precipitated by an application of the Provincial Crown ordering the
78. Isaac, supra note 5 at 26.
79. Ibid. at 27.
80. Supra note 13.
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removal of certain hunting cabins erected by a number of Mi'kmaq from
Conne River, in the Bay du Nord Wilderness Reserve. The defendants
opposed the application, claiming that the cabins were "necessary for
the exercise of claimed rights to fish, hunt and trap"'" in their traditional
territory and that these pursuits were protected by Mi'kmaq treaty and
Aboriginal rights.8 2
As noted above, the historical record indicates that the Beothuk were
the original inhabitants of the Island of Newfoundland, with the Mi'kmaq
settling the island following the arrival of the Europeans. As we have
also seen from Van der Peet and its progeny, non-title rights, with the
notable exception of Mrtis rights, are crystallized at the time of European
contact. Adding further complexity, the ongoing power struggle between
Britain and France lead to a series of treaties in the 1700s, which were
interrupted by hostilities among the British, the French and the Mi'kmaq.
Finally, the political devolution of power to the Colony, and then the
Dominion, of Newfoundland and Newfoundland's eventual inclusion in
Confederation in 1949 present unique challenges when tracing the power
of extinguishment and its use.
In his voluminous decision, Barry J. extensively reviewed the
historical record as presented at trial. The evidence of first contact, linked
as it is with the claim for Aboriginal rights, was of primary importance.
Similarly, the period between approximately 1720 and 1770, during
which a number of agreements were reached between the British and the
Mi'kmaq, was thoroughly examined. Finally, the legislative history of
Newfoundland from the granting of representative government in 1832
through to Confederation in 1949 was briefly examined in relation.to the
issue of extinguishment.
Barry J. held that by at least 1550 European contact had occurred
and such contact was sufficient to prevent the creation of new Aboriginal
rights:
Accepting that contact is in fact the legal test for aboriginal rights, it is
clear, based on the archaeological evidence earlier noted that contact had
occurred between the Europeans and the Mi'kmaq by 1550, long before
any evidence of the arrival of the Mi'kmaq in Newfoundland.... Even
accepting that this Court should not assume Mi'kmaq practices, customs
and traditions immediately changed with initial European encounters,
the archaeological assemblages in Nova Scotia satisfy me that by
1550 there were sufficient European influences on Mi'kmaq culture to
prevent practices commencing after that date (such as fishing, hunting,
and trapping in Newfoundland) from meeting the test of "aboriginal"
81. Drew (Trial), supra note 75 at para. 3.
82. Ibid.
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set out in Delgamuukw and Mitchell. Historical references to Mi'kmaq
use of European technology such as shallops by 1602 support this
timeframe.83
As Barry J. emphasized, 1550 is a date considerably before the historical
record shows Mi'kmaq arrival in Newfoundland. The Mi'kmaq did not
carry on fishing, hunting and trapping in Newfoundland prior to first
contact; thus there could be no creation of a Mi'kmaq Aboriginal right in
Newfoundland to fish, hunt, and trap. In addition, Barry J. concluded that
"even if the Mi'kmaq ancestors were present on the Island of Newfoundland
before European contact, the Defendants have not proven on a balance of
probabilities that they then fished, hunted or trapped in the territory known
as the Bay du Nord Wilderness Area." 4
In the defendants' treaty rights claim, Barry J. focused his analysis on
the four treaties upon which the defendants' founded their claim:
* The 1725 treaty negotiated at Boston by Paul Mascarene, on behalf
of Nova Scotia, and subsequently ratified at Annapolis Royal in 1726
by John Doucett, Lieutenant Governor of Annapolis, and seventy-
seven Mi'kmaq, Maliseet and Passamaquoddy representatives;
* The 1752 treaty signed by Nova Scotia Governor Peregrine Thomas
Hopson and Chief Jean Baptiste Cope, on behalf of the Shubenacadie
Band of Mi'kmaq;
* The 1759 Schomberg -Whitmore treaty; and
* The treaty of June 25, 1761, signed at Belcher's Farm in Halifax by
Chief Jeannot, on behalf of the Cape Breton Mi'kmaq Band, and
Lieutenant-Governor Belcher and colonial officials, on behalf of
Nova Scotia. 5
Barry J. then addressed each in turn.
The Treaty of 1725-1726
Justice Barry rejected the defendants' claim for treaty rights pursuant to the
Treaty of 1725-1726. He found that the forbearers of the defendants were
not party to the treaty, noting that the draft treaty of 1725 made reference
on seven occasions to the tribes or the government of the "Territories of
Nova Scotia or Accadie and New England. 8 6 The Treaty ratified in 1726
contained numerous similar references, which demonstrated a common
83. Ibid at para. 626.
84. Ibid. atpara. 1156.
85. Ibid. at para. 995.
86. Ibid. at para. 1026.
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intention of the parties that the treaty bind the natives of Nova Scotia only.87
As such the geographic scope of the treaty did not extend to either Cape
Breton, where the defendants' forbearers originated, or Newfoundland,
the locus of the claim.
Interestingly, Barry J. also held that subsequent hostilities between
the Mi'kmaq and the British effectively terminated the treaty:
As explained by Dr. Patterson, the Mi'kmaq allied themselves with the
French when war. broke out in 1744 between Britain and France. I agree
with Dr. Patterson that the subsequent behaviour of both Mi'kmaq and
British indicates that neither felt bound by the Treaty of 1725-26 and that
both believed the treaty was terminated by their hostilities. Accordingly,
even if the treaty had been intended to apply to Cape Breton Mi'kmaq,
generally, which I do not accept, the Defendants cannot now rely upon
this treaty as descendants of the Cape Breton band, since the treaty was
repudiated'by the parties.8"
The Treaty of 1752
Following the same reasoning as in his review of the Treaty of 1725-1726,
Barry J. found that the Treaty of 1752 was geographically limited to Nova
Scotia and did not include Cape Breton, 89 which at the time remained
a French outpost. Further, the Court noted that the Supreme Court in
Marshall 1 had found the 1752 Treaty to be between the Crown and the
Shubenacadie Band.9' In any event, like the previous treaty, Barry J. held
that this treaty too was repudiated by subsequent hostilities:
This treaty was terminated by subsequent hostilities between the
parties. Dr. Patterson confirmed that, as noted in Marshall, skirmishing
commenced again in 1753 between the British and the Mi'kmaq.
The Mi'kmaq signatory, Major Jean Baptiste Cape, staged a violent
demonstration of his repudiation of the treaty. I note the subsequent
treaties of 1761-62 did not renew this treaty and I am satisfied it was
repudiated by the subsequent hostilities. 92
87. Ibid. Note that at the time of the agreement Cape Breton was not part of Nova Scotia, but was
under French control.
88. Ibid. at para. 1027. This finding was also noted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Sappier
supra note 35 at para. 64.
89. Ibid. atpara. 1030.
90. Marshall I, supra note 51:
91. Drew (Trial), supra note 75 at para. 1031.
92. Ibid. atpara. 1033.
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The 1759 Schomberg - Whitmore Treaty
The Schomberg-Whitmore Treaty no longer appears to exist. Relying
on secondary sources, the Court held that with the fall of Louisbourg on
Cape Breton Island in July 1758 and the defeat of the French in Quebec in
1759, British Lieutenant Schomberg was charged with ending privateering
out of Merigomish, Pictou County, Nova Scotia. 93 Further, articles of
capitulation were signed by the Mi'kmaq at Pictou and Merigomish.94
The missing Schomberg-Whitmore Treaty, however, appears to have been
subsequently signed at Louisbourg and to have contained a pledge that
the Mi'kmaq would be free to enjoy "all our possessions, your liberty,
property with free exercise of your religion. 95
When interpreting the pledge, Barry J. held that:
The aboriginals dealing with Lieutenant Schomberg had territory within
which to exercise any rights granted, namely, their traditional territory
within Cape Breton. I conclude restricting any rights granted to that
territory was the common intention that best reconciled Mi'kmaq and
British interests. 96
In further support of this position, Barry, J. noted that Schomberg and
his immediate superior, General Whitmore, had no jurisdiction to make
any commitments with respect to any rights or privileges on the Island
of Newfoundland, where other British representatives were responsible.97
This view of the historical situation, however, was not used as a technical
legal argument, but as an indicium of intent.
With the geographical reach of the Treaty determined, the Court turned
to-its substance, indicating that the Treaty likely "did not include trading
rights or ... anything other than submissions and oaths of allegiance." 98 As
such not only does the Schomberg-Whitmore Treaty not appear to give the
Mi'kmaq rights to hunt, fish and trap in Newfoundland, it does not appear
to give them those rights in Cape Breton.
Treaty of 1761 (Belcher Declaration)
In June of 1761, Chief Jeannot Pequidoualouet signed a treaty with the
Acting Lieutenant Governor of Nova Scotia, Jonathan Belcher-the Treaty
of 1761. Although this Treaty has not been found, the parties agreed that it
was likely similar to that signed with the Shediac Band in the same month
93. Ibid. atpara. 1036.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid. at para. 1037.
96. Ibid. at para. 1038.
97. Ibid. at para. 1039.
98. Ibid. at para. 1042.
Aboriginal Rights and the Atlantic Canada 403
Petroleum Industry
and it was likely the defendants' ancestors who were beneficiaries under
the Treaty.99 Nevertheless, Barry J. did not find that the Treaty gave rise
to any treaty rights in favour of the defendants. By the time Governor
Belcher signed the treaty, Cape Breton was controlled by the British.10
However, as with-the prior treaties, Barry J. did not find any intent on
the part of the Crown to grant rights over lands in Newfoundland, which
remained under separate political control.' Similarly, Barry J. held that
the nature of the Mi'kmaq visits to Newfoundland were not sufficient to
include any new lands in the Mi'kmaq traditional territory:
The geographic extent of treaty rights is normally restricted to the
territory that was part of the traditional territory of the aboriginal
community at the time the treaty was made. I do not accept that the
occasional and sporadic visits of the Mi'kmaq to Newfoundland between
1713 and 1761 ... establish that the Island of Newfoundland was part
of the traditional territory of the Mi'kmaq, even if Governor Belcher
was aware of the Mi'kmaq visits to Newfoundland, of which I have
no evidence.... I do not agree that occasional Mi'kmaq appearances
in Newfoundland before 1761, more than 200 years following initial
contact with Europeans and utilizing European technology, warrant the
conclusion that Governor Belcher should be taken to have intended to
include Newfoundland in the territory affected by the Treaty of 1761.
I am not satisfied the Mi'kmaq would have intended this either. I find
support for this conclusion in the practice of the British, from at least as
far back as the treaties of 1725-26, when separate treaties were prepared
for Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Nova Scotia, which would have
made very clear to natives that different British officials had authority to
treat for different territories." 2
Extinguishment
Because Newfoundland did not join Confederation until 1949, the locus of
the power to extinguishAboriginal rights in Newfoundland had an.evolution
distinct from that in the Maritime Provinces. Although representative
government came to Newfoundland in 1832 and responsible government
in 1855, it is not clear precisely when the power to extinguish Aboriginal
rights shifted from the Imperial Crown in Britain to the Newfoundland
Crown. There is no pre-Confederation legislation specifically addressing
Aboriginal matters, other than that prohibiting the removal of Innu and
Nascapi-Montagnais from Labrador."°3 Nevertheless, as discussed above,
99. Ibid. at para. 1047.
100. Ibid. at para. 1050.
101. Ibid. at para. 1050.
102. Ibid. at para. 1054.
103. Ibid. at para. 1078.
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the Court did find a Crown grant to a pulp and paper company would have
extinguished Aboriginal rights, if they existed.'04
The unanimous decision of the Court of Appeal confirmed Barry J.'s
analysis and conclusions. It is noteworthy that, on appeal, the defendants/
appellants took a new tack in their legal argument. They argued that the
critical point in time for the establishment of Aboriginal rights is not the
time of European contact, but the time of British sovereignty or control
over the lands in question. They suggested this would be 1763, when the
Treaty of Paris was signed between Britain and France. 105 The appellants'
legal argument was summarized by the Court as follows:
The appellants say that the Van der Peet pre-European contact test is
inconsistent with the purpose underlying s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act,
1982, that it lacks a convincing rationale and that it is not in harmony
with the basic tenants *[sic] of other aboriginal rights as laid down by
the Supreme Court of Canada. The underlying purpose of s. 35(1), as
indicated above, is the protection and reconciliation of the interests
which arise from the fact that prior to the arrival of Europeans in North
America aboriginal peoples lived on the land in distinctive societies, with
their own practices, customs and traditions: Van der Peet at para. 44. The
appellants say that the rigid "prior to contact with the Europeans" test
adopted in Van der Peet was peculiar to the facts of that case and has, in
fact, been applied with flexibility in subsequent cases. They refer to R.
v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101, andR. v. Cdtj, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139, two
cases which were dealt with by the trial judge, but, more particularly and
with greater emphasis, to R. v. Powley, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 207, and, less
so, to R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220 (Marshall #3),
which are decisions that postdate the trial judge's decision."
Based on this assertion of inconsistency with the Constitution Act, 1982
and post- Van der Peet07 flexibility, the appellants contended that it would
be inequitable to deny to Mi'kmaq in Newfoundland Aboriginal rights
granted to the Mi'kmaq in Nova Scotia because the Mi'kmaq moved to
Newfoundland after European contact. Instead, they suggested "a two-
pronged test that would allow for the mobility of aboriginal rights existing
104. Ibid. at para. 1155.
105. Ibid. at para. 7. It should be noted that by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 France had ceded
sovereignty over Newfoundland to the British. However, the Treaty of Paris in 1763 transferred
all French territory in North America to the British, with the exception of St. Pierre and Miquelon,
effectively ending their North American power struggle.
106. Drew (CA), supra note 13 at para. 44.
107. Van der Peet, supra note 22.
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at the date of European contact, provided any move to the new location
occurred before the establishment of effective British sovereignty."' 8
The appellants relied heavily on the adaptation of the Van der Peet
criteria in R. v. Pbwley,'O° where the Supreme Court of Canada recognized
that Mtis Aboriginal rights arose in the period between European contact
and effective European control. This was premised on the view that the
"constitutionally significant feature of the Mtis is their special status as
peoples that emerged between first contact and the effective imposition of
European control."' 0 Although the Court did not expressly refer to it, the
Mi'kmaq, unlike the Mtis, were not a people that "emerged between first
contact and effective European control." In concluding its analysis, the
Court was clear and concise:
In summary, and with the greatest respect, Powley is not a break with
the Vanderpeet test, and it does not, on any basis, signal. the situational
flexibility that the appellants seek. Nor does it exhibit the discrimination
which the appellants contend it does. In the final analysis, the appellants'
argument is for the law as they would wish it to be, not as it is."'
In summary, the Drew decisions demonstrate some of the unique historical
complexities involved in assessing Aboriginal rights issues in Atlantic
Canada. Leave to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court of Canada was
recently dismissed.
In Labrador Mtis Nation v. Newfoundland & Labrador (Minister of
Transportation & Works)," 2 the Labrador Mtis Nation brought an action
against the Provincial Crown seeking a determination of its right to be
consulted on the construction of a 250km section of the Trans Labrador
Highway in south and central Labrador. The case was limited to a
consideration of the right to be consulted and was not a determination of
Aboriginal status or Aboriginal rights.
Fowler J. conducted a preliminary evaluation on both the strength
of the Labrador Mtis Nation's claim and its ability to hold Aboriginal
rights. Justice Fowler's evaluation examined the question of the historical
presence of the Labrador Mtis in the defined area of the present occupation.
108. Drew (CA), supra note 13 at para. 45. This approach was drawn primarily from Professor Brian
Slattery's critique in "Making Sense of Aboriginal and Treaty rights" (2000), 79 Can. Bar Rev. at
196.
109. R. v. Powley, 2003 SCC 43, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 207 [Powley].
110. Ibid. at para. 17.
111. Drew (CA), supra note 13 at para. 67.
112. Labrador M9tis Nation v. Newfoundland & Labrador (Minister of Transportation & Works),
2006 NLTD 119, (2006), 258 Nfld & P.E.I.R. 257 [Labrador Mitis].
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Because of the nature of the application, the trial did not engage in the
same level of expansive evidentiary presentation and review as in Drew
(Trial).113 Nevertheless, considerable historical evidence was put before
the Court, including the use of expert witnesses in the fields of history and
archaeology. Reviewing the scholarly evidence, Fowler J. observed that:
generally it is agreed that the period from first contact around 1550, to
the period of effective European control around 1760 that there were
Inuit people using the southern regions of Labrador in one capacity or
another....
Whatever the date of full occupation by the Inuit it is the conclusion
of this Court that there is a very high probability that the Inuit people
emerged along the southern coast of Labrador prior to and continuous
with the gradual appearance and introduction of the Europeans for at
least two hundred years before effective control by the British. l" 4
In the early post-contact period, these Inuit intermingled with Europeans.
This intermingling and the historical evidence of their cultural practices
led Fowler J. to conclude that "there is a strong case to be made for
recognizing a regional community of Labrador Mrtis people of mixed
Inuit and European ancestry along the east and south coast of Labrador."'" 5
Further, Fowler J. was satisfied that "the modem day people who claim
that they are Mdtis are descendants from this early new culture and have,
since the sixteenth century, gradually migrated throughout the south
coastal region of Labrador."" 6
Based on the foregoing, Fowler J. held that
There is a credible but unproven claim, the likelihood for recognition
of the Labrador Mrtis people is on the high end of the spectrum and,
notwithstanding that the lands claimed and use of the land claimed is
still to be determined and the potential for damage or impairment to the
claimed rights uncertain, the duty to consult must be on a meaningful
level." 7
He then went on to note that the claim to central Labrador is "historically less
defined than to the coastal region of southern Labrador."" 8 Nevertheless, the
113. Supra note 75.
114. Labrador Matis, supra note 112 at paras. 48-49.
115. Ibid. at para. 72.
116. Ibid.
117. Ibid. at para. 130.
118. Ibid. at para. 133.
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Government of Newfoundland and Labrador was ordered to "immediately
commence meaningful consultation with the Labrador Mdtis Nation."" 9
b. Maritime Provinces
In Nova Scotia and New Brunswick the two Marshall decisions 20 continue
to shape the evolution and application of Aboriginal rights in both provinces.
Although the Marshall decisions undoubtedly had a national impact on the
development of Aboriginal rights, their regional impact has been increased
because of the historical and contextual similarities between the events
analyzed in those decisions and subsequent decisions arising out of the
historical realities of the region. As such, this section will re-examine the
Marshall cases before considering the more prominent recent decisions
stemming from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.
Marshall land Marshall II recognized a treaty right to fish for trade. 12'
The case arose from the arrest and prosecution of Donald Marshall Jr. for
the capture and sale of 463 pounds of eel from the coastal waters off Nova
Scotia. Specifically, he was charged with selling eel without a licence,
fishing without a licence, and fishing during the closed season with illegal
nets. The sole issue of the case was whether the accused had a defence
based on an existing treaty right to fish for and trade eel.
The accused relied on a Mi'kmaq Treaty of Peace and Friendship
(the Treaty) signed with the British on 10 March 1760, in Halifax, Nova
Scotia. Specifically, the accused relied upon alleged oral terms and the
implications of the trade clause in the text. 22 The crucial trading clause
provides as follows:
And I do further engage that we will not traffick, barter or Exchange any
Commodities in any manner but with such persons or the managers of
such Truck houses as shall be appointed or Established by His Majesty's
Governor.'23
Based largely on the interpretative principles outlined in the section on
treaties above, the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the
appeal:
Because nothing less would uphold the honour and integrity of the
Crown in its dealings with the Mi'kmaq people to secure their peace
119. Ibid. at para. 137.
120. Marshall I, supra note 51 and R. v. Marshall, [ 1999] 3 S.C.R. 533 [Marshall 11].
121. In the case R. v. Denny, [1990] 55 C.C.C. (3d) 322 (N.S.C.A.), the Court recognized a limited
Aboriginal right to fish for food.
122. Marshall 1, supra note 51 at paras. 2-3.
123. Ibid. at para. 5.
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and friendship as best the content of those treaty promises can now be
ascertained. 24
Based on the historical record of the events and negotiations leading to
the Treaty, the Court took the view that although the text of the Treaty did
not explicitly guarantee a right to access wildlife, without the assurance of
this right, the trade clause could not have advanced the British objective
of peace with a self-sufficient Mi'kmaq people. Therefore, the right to fish
was a guarantee implicit in the right to trade. 15 More precisely still, the
Court found nothing in the record of negotiation leading up to or in the
Treaty itself on the right to fish, but nevertheless implied this term into the
text based on presumed intentions of the parties and regard for the honour
of the Crown. 126 Justice Binnie characterized the treaty right as follows:
My view is that the surviving substance of the treaty is not the literal
promise of a truckhouse, but a treaty right to continue to obtain
necessaries through hunting and fishing by trading the products of those
traditional activities subject to restrictions that can be justified under the
Badger test. 27
The Court found that the fact that the Mi'kmaq rights to hunt, fish and
trade under the Treaty were no greater than the rights enjoyed by other
inhabitants did not detract from the higher protection they currently offer
to the Mi'kmaq people, unless it could be demonstrated that those rights
were extinguished prior to 17 April 1982.128
After finding a treaty right to fish, the Court limited its scope.
29
The right contemplated was not a right to trade generally for economic
gain and the accumulation of wealth, but was limited to the right to trade
for the purposes of a moderate livelihood. This was characterized as
the day to day needs of "food, clothing and housing, supplemented by
a few amenities."'30 The Court took the position that catch limits could
be established by regulation and enforced without violating treaty rights,
124. Ibid. at para. 4.
125. Ibid. at para. 35.
126. Ibid. at para. 43.
127. Ibid. at para. 56. In R v. Bernard, 2005 SCC 43, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220 [Bernard] at para. 19
the Court emphasized again that "the right conferred is not the right to harvest, in itself, but the right
to trade" and at para. 20 that the right falls short of "a general right to harvest or gather all natural
resources then used."
128. Marshall I, supra note 51 at para. 48.
129. Ibid. at para. 57.
130. Ibid. at para. 59. The Court relied upon the meaning of "moderate livelihood" as it was expressed
in Gladstone, supra note 34 at para. 165.
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provided they allowed for an amount that could reasonably be expected to
produce this moderate livelihood. 3'
Mr. Marshall was acquitted on the basis that he had a treaty right to
fish for eel and sell eel to support himself and his wife. The closed season
and the imposition of a discretionary licensing system interfered with his
right to fish for trade purposes. The ban on the sale of Mr. Marshall's catch
would infringe his right to trade for sustenance if it were enforced)3 2
After the release of the 17 September 1999 decision in Marshall I,
the West Nova Fisherman's Coalition (the Coalition) made an application
to the Supreme Court of Canada for a rehearing to address the issue of
the Government of Canada's regulatory authority over the fisheries; to
order a new trial to allow the Crown to justify the licensing and closed
season restrictions on the exercise of the accused's treaty rights; and to
order a stay of the Court's decision in Marshall L Both the appellant and
the Crown opposed the application. The Court dismissed the Coalition's
application, but took the opportunity to clarify what it identified as "a
basic misunderstanding of the scope of the Court's majority reasons" that
were reflected in the Coalition's application 33 and unjustified assumptions
made by the Native Council of Nova Scotia. 34
The Court nevertheless stated that an accused could in future cases
attempt to show that the treaty right intended in 1760 included access to
"resources other than fish, wildlife and traditionally gathered things such
as fruits and berries."'1 35
The Court was quick, however, to offer a clarification, and by impli-
cation a limitation, on which resources could conceivably be included in
the right by explaining what was meant by the term "gathered" in the 17
September 1999 judgment. The term was to be interpreted as relating
to the types of resources which could have reasonably been within the
contemplation of the parties to the 1760-1761 treaties 36 and did not include
"anything and everything" physically capable of being gathered. 137 More
131. Marshall I, supra note 51 at para. 61.
132. Ibid. at para. 66. The dissenting Justices, McLachlin J. and Gonthier J., held the view that the
Treaties of 1760-61 did not grant a freestanding right to truckhouses or a general right to trade, and
while they did create an exclusive trade and truckhouse regime which gave the Mi'kmaq the limited
right to bring goods to British trade outlets, this system died out in the 1780s and correspondingly the
right to bring goods to trade ended.
133. Marshall 11, supra note 120 at para. 11.
134. Ibid. at para. 19.
135. Ibid.
136. Ibid
137. Ibid. at para. 20.
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pointedly, the Court commented on the unlikelihood that treaty rights
would include, inter alia, offshore natural gas deposits:
No evidence was drawn to our attention, nor was any argument made
in the course of this appeal, that trade in logging or minerals, or the
exploitation of off-shore natural gas deposits, was in the contemplation of
either or both parties to the 1760 treaty; nor was any argument made that
the exploitation of such resources could be considered a logical evolution
of treaty rights to fish and wildlife or to the type of things traditionally
"gathered" by the Mi'kmaq in a 1760 aboriginal lifestyle.'
Furthermore, the Court referred to three additional limits to treaty rights
identified in Marshall 1:
1. No treaty was made by the British with the Mi'kmaq population as a
whole and that the area in which treaty rights could be exercised was
limited to the area "traditionally used by the local community with
which the ... treaty was made";
2. The rights could only be exercised under the "authority of the local
community to which the accused belongs"; and
3. The scope of the right was limited to obtaining from the identified
resource only what was necessary to trade for "necessaries."'' 9
The Court also clearly affirmed the government's general regulatory
power as a possible jusitification of future restrictions on the exercise of
treaty rights. 140 The Court indicated that in addition to conservation, other
substantial and compelling objectives may include economic and regional
fairness and recognition of the historic reliance of non-Aboriginal groups
on the fisheries. Summing up its ruling on the issue of regulation, the
Court stated:
The Minister has available for regulatory purposes the full range of
resource management tools and techniques, provided their use to limit the
exercise of a treaty right can be justified. If the Crown establishes that the
limitations on the treaty right are imposed for a pressing and substantial
public purpose, after appropriate consultation with the aboriginal
community, and go no further than is required, the same techniques of
resource conservation and management as are used to -control the non-
native fishery may be held to be justified. Equally, however, the concerns
and proposals of the native communities must be taken into account, and
this might lead to different techniques of conservation and management
138. Ibid.
139. Ibid. at para. 17.
140. Ibid. at para. 25.
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in respect of the exercise of the treaty right.' 4
1
The Supreme Court of Canada decision in Bernard' 42 addresses Aboriginal
title, Aboriginal rights and treaty rights in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.
Bernard originated out of appeals from the New Brunswick Court ofAppeal
decision in R. v. Bernard'4 3 and the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal decision
in R. v. Marshall.'" Both of these dealt with the issue of Whether Mi'kmaq
persons have treaty rights or Aboriginal title permitting them to log Crown
land for commercial purposes.' 45 The Court proceeded on the basis that
the British had established sovereignty in 1759 in the relevant portions of
New Brunswick, 1713 in mainland Nova Scotia, and 1763 in Cape Breton.
The foundations of the treaty claims were the Royal Proclamation'4 and
Governor Belcher's Proclamation.
Before undertaking the analysis of whether Aboriginal title was
established, the Supreme Court made two preliminary statements regarding
how the analysis must proceed. The first sets out the method by which
the Aboriginal and European legal. perspectives are to be considered.
The second identifies Aboriginal title, not as a stand-alone right, but as
one of the possible spectra of independent Aboriginal rights that may be
affirmed. 147
With regard to legal perspectives, the task is to view the pre-sovereignty
practice from the perspective of the Aboriginal people and then to
translate this practice into a common law right. In order to accomplish
this, one must consider the nature of the common law right and whether
the particular Aboriginal practice fits it. Exact conformity to the precise
legal parameters of the common law right is not necessary.'48 The Court
stated that Aboriginal title is established by Aboriginal practices that
indicate possession similar to that associated with title at common law. 49
141. Ibid. at para. 43-44.
142. Supra note 127.
143. R. v. Bernard, 2003 NBCA 55, (2003), 230 D.L.R. (4th) 57, 262 N.B.R. (2d) I [Bernard (CA)].
144. R. v. Marshall, 2003 NSCA 105, (2003), 218 N.S.R. (2d) 78 [Stephen Marshall (CA)].
145. In Stephen Marshall (C.A.), Marshall and thirty-four other Mi'kmaq persons were charged with
cutting timber on Crown lands in Nova Scotia without authorization contrary to s. 29 of the Crown
Lands Act. Bernard, also Mi'kmaq, was charged with unlawful possession of spruce logs he was
hauling from a cutting site to a local sawmill in contravention of s. 67(l)(c ) of the Crown Lands and
Forests Act (New Brunswick). In both cases the trial Courts entered convictions which were set aside
by the respective Courts of Appeal. In Stephen Marshall, (CA.) a new trial was ordered while in
Bernard an acquittal was entered.
146. Royal Proclamation 1763 (UK), reprinted R-S.C. 1985, App. 11, No. I [Royal Proclamation].
147. Bernard, supra note 127 at para. 53.
148. Ibid. at para. 48. The question, stated by the Court, is "whether the practice corresponds to the
core concepts of the legal right claimed."
149. Ibid. at para. 54.
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Considering first the basis for Aboriginal title under the common law, the
Supreme Court turned to the test established in Delgamuukw, and within
the context of Bernard (CA), further developed the idea of occupation. 50
In Delgamuukw, the standard of occupation was set out as the exclusive,
pre-sovereignty occupation of the land of the Aboriginal group's forbears.'I'
The Court stated that the meaning of "exclusive" occupation is consistent
with the concept of title to land at common law and means "the intention
and capacity to retain exclusive control," but is not negated by occasional
acts of trespass or the presence of other Aboriginal groups with consent.
52
In Bernard, the Court recognized a person with adequate possession for
title may choose to use it intermittently or sporadically and at common
law, exclusivity does not preclude consensual arrangements that recognize
shared title to the same parcel of land. 53 Furthermore, the Court stated
that evidence of acts of exclusion are not required to establish Aboriginal
title. 154 Rather "[a]ll that is required is a demonstration of effective control
of the land by the group, from which a reasonable inference can be drawn
that it could have excluded others had it chosen to do so.' ' 55
The question of whether nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples can
successfully claim Aboriginal title will depend on the evidence. The test
will be whether a nomadic people had a sufficient "physical possession" to
give them title to the land. This will be a question of fact, dependent on all
the circumstances and, in particular, the nature of the land and the manner
in which it is commonly used. In each case, the question is whether "a
degree of physical occupation or use equivalent to common law title has
been made out"; 56 given the requirement for exclusive physical occupation
of the land, the Court acknowledged that seasonal hunting and fishing
rights exercised in a particular area will likely translate into Aboriginal
rights to fish and hunt, not into Aboriginal title. 57
In R. v. Marshall [Stephen Marshall (Trial)],158 Curran Prov. Ct. J.
concluded that the line separating sufficient and insufficient occupancy for
title is between the irregular use of undefined lands on the one hand and
regular use of defined lands on the other. Curran Prov. Ct. J. concluded
that the Mi'kmaq.of 18th century mainland Nova Scotia probably had
150. Ibid at para. 40.
151. Ibid. at para. 149.
152. Delgaumuukw, supra note 18 at para. 156.
153. Bernard, supra note 127 at para. 54.
154. Ibid. at para. 65.
155. Ibid.
156. Ibid at para. 66.
157. Ibid. at para. 58.
158. R. v. Marshall, 2001 NSPC 2, [2001] 2 C.N.L.R. 256 [Stephen Marshall (Trial)].
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Aboriginal title to lands around their local communities, but not to the
sites from which the logs were harvested.' In Bernard (Trial),160 Lordon
Prov. Ct. J. found that occasional visits to an area did not establish title,
rather there must be "evidence of capacity to retain exclusive control." He
concluded that the land at the centre of the case was not used on a regular
basis, as trips made there in 1759 would have been occasional forays
for hunting, fishing and gathering. This was not sufficient to establish
Aboriginal title. 161
The Supreme Court of Canada found that the Mi'kmaq practice of
moving inland in the winter to hunt and fish, and the proximity of the
cutting sites to traditional settlement sites, amounted only to evidence
that the cutting area would have been within the range of seasonal use
and occupation by Miramichi Mi'kmaq. However, this alone would not
support a finding of Aboriginal title. The Supreme Court of Canada found
that to confer title in the absence of evidence of sufficiently regular and
exclusive pre-sovereignty occupation would "transform the ancient right
into a new and different right" and that this would obliterate the distinction
that the Supreme Court had consistently made between lesser Aboriginal
rights such as the right to fish and the highest form of Aboriginal right, the
right to title to the land. 62
Finally, the Supreme Court addressed whether Aboriginal title arose as
a result of the Royal Proclamation or Belcher's Proclamation. The Court
determined first that the Royal Proclamation applies to Nova Scotia. 163
However, the Supreme Court determined that the text of the document
supported the Crown's argument that it did not grant the Mi'kmaq title to
all the territories of the former Colony of Nova Scotia.
The Court found that a defence based on Belcher's Proclamation faced
formidable hurdles, including: whether Belcher had the authority to make
the Proclamation; whether the Proclamation was merely a temporary
and conditional order of His Majesty; and whether there was evidence
of Mi'kmaq reliance or dishonourable Crown conduct." -The Court
commented that Belcher's Proclamation appeared to be intended to apply
only to certain coastal areas and to hunting, fowling and fishing activities
159. . v. Bernard, [2000] 3 C.N.L.R. 184 [Bernard (Trial)].
160. Ibid. at para. 155.
161. Ibid. at para. 107.
162. Bernard, supra note 127 at para. 77.
163. Ibid. at para. 87.
164. Ibid. at para. 105.
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and, on the evidence, held that Belcher's Proclamation did not provide a
defence to the charges against the respondents. 65
In coming to its conclusions on treaty rights, the Court addressed
the scope of the treaty right found in Marshall I and Marshall 11, and,
in particular, whether the scope of that right extends to the harvest of
logs from Crown land for commercial purposes. Affirming the principle
established in Marshall P66 the Supreme Court in Bernard reiterated that
"the right to trade in traditional products carried with it an implicit right to
harvest those resources,"' 67 but it emphasized that the right is "not the right
to harvest, in itself, but the right to trade.'16 The right is not "a general
right to harvest or gather all natural resources then used."'169
The key issue at stake when determining the scope of a treaty right is
whether the modem trading activity is a logical evolution of the traditional
trading activity. Treaty rights are not frozen in time 170 and are not to
be unfairly confined'simply by changes in the economy or technology,
but "[w]hile treaty rights are capable of evolution within limits, ... their
subject matter ... cannot be wholly transformed."' 71
In Stephen Marshall (Trial), the Provincial Court Judge found that the
respondents had not met the legal test:
Trade in logging is not the modem equivalent or a logical evolution
of Mi'kmaq use of forest resources in daily life in 1760 even if those
resources sometimes were traded. Commercial logging does not bear the
same relation to the traditional limited use of forest products as fishing
for eels today bears to fishing for eels or any other species in 1760...
Whatever rights the defendants have to trade in forest products are far
narrower than the activities which give rise to these charges.172
The Provincial Court Judge made similar findings in Bernard (Trial).173
The Supreme Court of Canada concluded that the evidence in both
cases supported the trial judges' conclusions that the commercial logging
that formed the basis of the charges against the respondents was not the
logical evolution of traditional Mi'kmaq trading activity protected by the.
Treaties of 1760-1761 and, therefore, was not a protected right.
165. Ibid.
166. Marshall I, supra note 51 at para. 35.
167. Bernard, supra note 127 at para. 19.
168. Ibid. at para. 19. This right is subject to restrictions that can be justified under the Badger test;
see Marshall , supra note 51 at para. 56.
.169. Ibid. at para. 20.
170. Ibid. at para. 25.
171. Marshall II, supra note 120 at para. 19.
172. Stephen Marshall (Trial), supra note 158 at para. 95.
173. Bernard (Trial), supra note 159.
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The issue of whether there can be an Aboriginal right to log on
Crown land was addressed in R. v. Sappier74 when the Supreme Court
of Canada considered appeals from two different cases: R. v. Gray'1 5
and R. v. Sappier.' Like Bernard, these cases involved the harvest
of timber on Crown land. All three respondents' were charged with
unlawful possession or cutting of Crown timber and the three argued in
defence that they possess an Aboriginal and treaty right to harvest timber
for personal use. In this case, unlike Bernard, the timber was not logged
for commercial purposes, but Mr. Gray intended to use the timber for
the purposes of making household cabinets, coffee and end tables and
mouldings. Mr. Sappier and Mr. Polchies harvested wood for home and
furniture construction and for firewood.
In addressing the Aboriginal right claim, the Supreme Court found
it necessary to determine the precise characterization of the nature of the
respondents' claims for the purposes of applying the test in Van der Peet.'
The Court stated that it is critically important to:
identify a practice that helps to define the distinctive way of life of the
community as an aboriginal community. The importance of leading
evidence about the pre-contact'practice upon which the claimed right is
based should not be understated. In the absence of such evidence, courts
will find it difficult to relate the claimed right to the pre-contact way of
life of the specific aboriginal people, so as to trigger s. 35 protection.17 9
The bulk o f evidence led at trial went to the importance of wood to
Aboriginal societies. The absence of evidence going to the practice
presented considerable difficulty for the Court. Ultimately, however, the
Court held that "courts must be prepared to draw necessary inferences
about the existence and integrality of a practice when direct evidence is
not available."' 80
The Court found that the way of life of the Maliseet and Mi'kmaq
during the pre-contact period was that of a migratory people who lived from
hunting and fishing and who used the rivers and lakes of Eastern Canada
for transportation. The practice to be considered then was the harvesting
of wood for certain uses that were directly associated with that way of
life. Specifically, the Court characterized the practice as the harvesting of
174. Sappier, supra note 35.
175. K v. Gray, 2004 NBCA 57, (2004), 273 N.B.R. (2d) 157 [Gray].
176. K v. Sappier, 2004 NBCA 56, (2004), 273 N.B.R. (2d) 93 [Sappier (CA)].
177. Messrs. Sappier and Polehies R.M. are Maliseet and Mr. Gray is Mi'kmaq.
178. Sappier, supra note 35 at para. 20.
179. Ibid. at para. 22.
180. Ibid. at para. 33.
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wood for domestic uses only for a member of the Aboriginal community.''
Thus, the right is strictly limited and characterized by the Court as to have
no commercial dimension and harvested wood for "domestic" uses cannot
be sold, traded or bartered to produce assets or raise money even if "the
object of such trade or barter is to finance the building of a dwelling."'82
After characterizing the practice, the Court identified the central
question before it as "whether the practice of harvesting wood for domestic
uses was integral to the distinctive culture of the Maliseet and Mi'kmaq,
pre-contact."' 83 The Court considered whether a practice undertaken for
survival purposes can" meet the "integral to a distinctive culture" test.
8 4
While the Court determined that there is no such thing as an Aboriginal
right to subsistence, it referenced prior cases (including Van der Peet, R.
v. Jones8' and Mitchell'16) as standing for the proposition that a traditional
means of subsistence can in some cases be considered integral to the
distinctive culture of the Aboriginal people.I87
The Court addressed the difficulties in establishing the meaning of
"distinctive culture." the Court explained that the proper analysis is to first
inquire into the way of life of the Maliseet and Mi'kmaq prior to contact
and then to seek to understand how the particular pre-contact practice
relied upon relates to that way of life. 88 Following this analysis and noting
a number of traditional uses of wood (i.e. shelter, transportation, fuel and
tools), the Court found that harvesting wood for domestic uses undertaken
for survival purposes was sufficient to meet the integral-to-a-distinctive
culture threshold.
On the issue of the continuity of the claimed right with the pre-contact
practice, the Court found the right to harvest wood for the construction of
temporary shelters must be allowed to evolve into a right to harvest wood
181. Ibid. at para. 24.
182. Ibid. at para. 25. Binnie J. agreed with the disposition of the appeal for the reasons provided
by Bastarache J., however, he disagreed with the ruling that harvested wood cannot be sold, traded
or bartered and suggested that sale and barter should be permissible within the reserve or another
Aboriginal community to produce assets or raise money for the construction of shelter as reflects a
flexible concept of the exercise of Aboriginal rights within modem Aboriginal communities. Sappier,
supra note 35 at para. 74.
183. Ibid. at para. 27.
184. Ibid at para. 38.
185. R. v. Jones, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 821 at para. 28.
186. Mitchell v. Minister of National Revenue, 2001 SCC 33, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911 at para. 12
[Mitchell].
187. Sappier, supra note 35 at para. 41.
188. Ibid. at para. 46.
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by modem means to be used in the construction of a modem dwelling., 9
Any other conclusion would freeze the right in its pre-contact form.
In its conclusion, the Supreme Court of Canada found that Mr. Gray
possessed an Aboriginal right to harvest wood for domestic uses on Crown
lands traditionally used for that purpose by members of the Pabineau First
Nation, while Messrs. Sappier and Polchies possessed an Aboriginal right
to harvest wood for domestic uses on Crown lands traditionally harvested
by members of the Woodstock First Nation.
III. The current state ofAboriginal rights claims and negotiations in
Atlantic Canada
Canadian courts have on several occasions suggested that negotiation
rather than litigation is the most appropriate method to resolve outstanding
issues related to Aboriginal and treaty rights. To varying degrees, the
governments of the Atlantic Canadian provinces have heeded this advice
and commenced negotiations. The status of these negotiations will be
summarized for each of the four provinces.
1. Nova Scotia
In September 1998, following negotiations related to the Sable Offshore
Energy Project and the Maritime and Northeast Pipeline, Canada, Nova
Scotia and the Assembly of Mi'kmaq Chiefs agreed to pursue a "Made-In-
Nova Scotia Process" to deal with outstanding treaty, title and Aboriginal
rights questions in Nova Scotia.' 90
On 7 June 2002, the Mi'kmaq of Canada and Nova Scotia signed an
umbrella agreement as part of the Made-In-Nova Scotia Process. This was
followed by a framework agreement among the same parties which was
concluded on 23 February 2007. A progress review is planned for 2009,
with an agreement in principle expected in 2011. This agreement is expected
to be followed by a final agreement and implementation plans.191
The umbrella agreement's recitals indicate that the outstanding issues
among the parties include the inherent right to self-govern, Aboriginal
rights (including assertions of title) and treaty issues. Pursuant to the
agreement, the parties agreed to work together in good faith to resolve
"mutual issues"; to negotiate a framework agreement for further
negotiations; and to develop terms of reference for a consultation process
189. Ibid. at para. 48.
190. Mikmaq Rights Initiative, "Recent Decisions," online: Mikmaq Rights Initiative <www.
niikmaqrights.com/recDecisions.php>.
191. Mikmaq Rights Initiative, "Timeline," online: Mikmaq Rights Initiative <www.mikrnaqrights.
com/timeline.php>.
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to address the nature of and process for the requirement of government to
consult with the Mi'kmaq of Nova Scotia.
The framework agreement was signed by the thirteen Mi'kmaq
Chiefs, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Nova Scotia and Her Majesty
in Right of Canada. The recitals to the agreement are informative, in that
they provide background information that may be relevant to negotiations
(e.g. Marshall I, Delgamuukw and Stephen Marshall). The recitals also
reference the constitutional protection for existing Aboriginal and treaty
rights pursuant to s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. They define the
broad issues to be negotiated as being the differing views with respect to
the legal status and effect of specific Mi'kmaq treaties and the existence,
scope, extent and beneficiaries of Mi'kmaq rights and title.
The term "Mi'kmaq Treaties" is defined as the treaties between
the ancestors of the Mi'kmaq of Nova Scotia and the British Crown,
including those signed in 1725-1726, 1749, 1752 and 1760-1761. The
negotiations pursuant to the framework agreement are not intended to be a
renegotiation of the Mi'kmaq Treaties, nor as a process which may lead to
their extinguishment. Rather, the objectives are to reconcile the respective
rights and interests of the parties through an accord that sets out the manner
in which the Mi'kmaq of Nova Scotia will exercise constitutionally
protected rights respecting land, resources and governance. The accord
is to be preceded by a memorandum of understanding, which will be a
compilation of the negotiations.192 The timeline for the memorandum of
understanding is six years from the date of execution of the framework
agreement. 3 The accord is expected within three years from the signing
of the memorandum of understanding. 194
2. New Brunswick
In New Brunswick, the Mi'kmaq and Maliseet First Nations, Province of
New Brunswick and the Government of Canada are currently involved
in tripartite exploratory discussions, the goal of which is to get a better
understanding of each party's interests and to establish a common
understanding to determine whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed
with framework agreement negotiations. 95
192. Framework Agreement, s. 22.
193. Framework Agreement, s. 26.
194. Framework Agreement, s. 28.
195. Canada, "Negotiation Tables Update," online: Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, DIAN
website <www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ps/clm/atr/ntu_e.html>.
Aboriginal Rights and the Atlantic Canada 419
Petroleum Industry
3. Prince Edward Island
The Province of Prince Edward Island and the Mi'kmaq First Nations
communities in the province are currently involved in bilateral exploratory
discussions to get a better understanding of each party's interests and to
establish a common understanding to determine whether to proceed with
framework agreement negotiations. 96
4. Newfoundland and Labrador
The Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement (the Agreement) was
signed by the President of the Labrador Inuit Association, the Premier
of Newfoundland and Labrador, the provincial Minister Responsible for
Aboriginal Affairs, and the federal Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development on 22 January 2005.
The Labrador Inuit Association represents approximately 5,300 Inuit
and Kablunangajuit (individuals of partial Inuit ancestry) who live primarily
in five coastal communities (Nain, Hopedale, Makkovik, Postville and
Rigolet) and the Upper Lake Melville area of Labrador.
The Agreement establishes the Labrador Inuit Settlement Area
(Settlement Area) totalling approximately 72,500 square kilometres of land
in northern Labrador, including 15,800 square kilometres of Inuit-owned
lands, known as Labrador Inuit Lands. The Settlement Area also includes
an adjacent Ocean Zone of 48,690 square kilometres and provides for the
establishment of the Torngat Mountains National Park Reserve, consisting
of approximately 9,600 square kilometres of land within the Settlement
Area. The Government of Canada has agreed to transfer $140 million
to the Labrador Inuit, as well as $156 million for implementation of the
Agreement.
The Agreement provides for the creation of the Nunatsiavut
Government, five Inuit community governments and Inuit community
corporations to represent Inuit living outside the Settlement Area. The
government will be democratically elected and financially accountable to
the electorate. The Nunatsiavut Government will be empowered to make
laws applicable to Inuit in Labrador Inuit Lands and Inuit communities
on culture, language, education, health and social services and for the
administration of Inuit law, including necessary enforcement structures.
The Agreement is a final settlement of the Aboriginal rights of the
Labrador Inuit in Canada. In exchange for the rights and benefits specified
in the Agreement, the Labrador Inuit will accede and release to Canada and
Newfoundland and Labrador all of their Aboriginal rights outside of the
196. Ibid.
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Labrador Inuit Lands and Aboriginal rights related to subsurface resources
within the Labrador Inuit Lands. The Labrador Inuit will retain all of their
Aboriginal rights within the Labrador Inuit Lands.
Within the Labrador Inuit Lands, the Inuit have ownership of 3,950
square kilometres (1,525 square miles) of land containing quarry materials
and have a twenty-five per cent ownership interest in subsurface resources.
In the Settlement Area outside of the Labrador Inuit Lands, the Nunatsiavut
Government will receive fifty per cent of the first $2,000,000 and five
per cent of any additional provincial revenues from subsurface resources.
Existing mineral rights holders in the Labrador Inuit Lands may continue
to access these Lands and regulation of such rights will remain with the
Government of Newfoundland and Labrador; however, any amendments
or extensions to existing exploration or quarrying operations must receive
joint approval from the Province and the Nunatsiavut Government.
The largest and most significant mineral development in Labrador is
the Voisey's Bay Project. The Agreement provides that the Nunatsiavut
Government will receive five per cent of provincial revenues from
subsurface resources of the Voisey's Bay area. Voisey's Bay area will not
be within the Labrador Inuit Lands, nor in the Settlement Area.
IV. The way forward for the oil and gas industry: dealing with
uncertainty
The existence of Aboriginal and treaty rights in Atlantic Canada and the
accompanying duty to consult where such rights may be infringed are
important considerations for any oil and gas project in the region. From
a narrow legal perspective, it is the Crown that bears the burden of the
duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples. Nonetheless, it is in a proponent's
best interest to take a proactive role in considering potential Aboriginal
claims due to the permits and approvals required to commence virtually
any project in the region. A proponent should undertake a preliminary
assessment of possible Aboriginal claims and, when necessary, consult
with Aboriginal groups through impact studies, joint meetings and
environmental assessments.
This consultation for such development projects arises when there is
a recognized right or the potential for a claim by an Aboriginal group.
The duty to consult "will vary with the circumstances, but always requires
meaningful, good faith consultation and willingness on the part of the
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Crown to make changes based on information that emerges during the
process."'' There is, however, no duty to reach an agreement.
Since the arrival of the Mi'kmaq in Newfoundland was post-first
contact with European peoples it is unlikely that a claim for non-title
Aboriginal rights by this group will be successful. 98 However, because
the time for the identification of Aboriginal title is the time at which the
Crown asserted sovereignty over the land (which may, in Newfoundland's
case, have been after the arrival of the Mi'kmaq), it remains to be seen
whether a claim for Mi'kmaq Aboriginal title might be successful. It is
worth noting, due to the limited geographic area encompassed by the
Mi'kmaq people in the province, that it seems unlikely that a successful
claim would be of relevance to an oil and gas project.
It is clear that the Peace & Friendship Treaties signed by Aboriginal
groups in Nova Scotia and considered in Drew (Trial), do not provide the
basis for treaty rights claims in Newfoundland and Labrador. In Labrador,
the Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement clarifies certain Aboriginal
issues in regard to the defined Settlement and Labrador Inuit Land Areas.
The agreement creates substantive Aboriginal rights in Northern Labrador.
However, Aboriginal rights for the Innu and the Mrtis have yet to be
definitively determined.
In the Maritimes, decisions such as Marshall 1, Marshall II, Bernard
and Sappier have confirmed that specific Aboriginal and treaty rights
to trade, hunt, harvest wood (for domestic use) and to gather traditional
resources exist in the Maritime Region. The term "traditional resources"
has not been fully defined, but the decisions in Marshall II and Bernard
clarify, in principle, that the right to gather resources is not a right to gather
all resources that can be gathered and further suggests that the right to
gather resources specifically does not include a right to offshore natural
gas deposits. 199
Aboriginal title has not yet been judicially established in the Maritime
Region; however, the historic records relied upon in the cases referenced
previously suggest that there is a high degree of likelihood of the possibility
of a successful claim.
As a result of the Supreme Court of Canada's comments in Marshall
II concerning offshore natural gas deposits,2 '° there is likely no duty to
consult Aboriginal communities in connection with infrastructure and
197. Taku River, supra note 46 at para. 29.
198. Drew (Trial), supra note 75 at para. 1156.
199. Marshall II, supra note 121 at para. 20 and Bernard, supra note 128 at para. 20.
200. Ibid.
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works located in the offshore regions of the Maritime Provinces. However,
because of the potential infringements of Aboriginal and treaty rights to
hunt, fish, harvest wood and gather resources, the inshore and offshore
activities related to offshore projects (e.g. pipelines, storage facilities and
service/supply infrastructure) may attract a duty to consult and possibly
accommodate.
The duty to consult is particularly relevant for projects located in
the Maritime Provinces where Aboriginal and treaty rights have. been -
judicially established. The situation in Newfoundland and Labrador is less
clear. Consideration will have to be given to the geographic location of the
proposed activity. For example, any activity in the Settlement and Labrador
Inuit Land Areas will have to abide by the terms of the Labrador Inuit Land
Claims Agreement. In light of the judicial reasoning regarding treaties
signed by the Mi'kmaq in Drew (Trial),2 ' it is unlikely that consultations
with the Mi'kmaq of Newfoundland regarding Aboriginal treaty rights
claims will be an issue. However, consultations may be required for
activities to be located in the area of existing Mi'kmaq communities (i.e.
Conne River) as a result of potential Aboriginal title claims.
201. Drew (Trial), supra note 75. Justice Barry found that Treaties signed by Mi'kmaq representatives
had either been extinguished, terminated by hostilities, were inapplicable due to geographic
considerations or that treaty rights claims were void for vagueness of language.
